



## CORONERS COURT OF NEW SOUTH WALES

<b>Inquest:</b>	Inquiry into the fire/explosion at the Israeli Consulate and Hakoah Club
<b>Hearing dates:</b>	5-6 and 8 December 2022
<b>Date of findings:</b>	23 December 2022
<b>Place of findings:</b>	Coroners Court of NSW, Lidcombe
<b>Findings of:</b>	<b>State Coroner, Magistrate Teresa O'Sullivan</b>
<b>Catchwords:</b>	CORONIAL LAW – general inquiry, cause, origin and circumstances, explosions at the Israeli Consulate and Hakoah Club in 1982, cold case investigation, act of international terrorism, May 15 terrorist organisation
<b>File number:</b>	2017/236112 and 2017/236149
<b>Representation:</b>	<p>Counsel Assisting: Dr D Kell SC with Ms E Sullivan of Counsel, instructed by Mr D Yang of the NSW Crown Solicitor's Office</p> <p>The Commissioner of the NSW Police Force: Mr R Coffey of Counsel, instructed by Ms R Atherton of the NSWPF Office of General Counsel (in relation to the application for protective orders)</p>

<p><b>Findings:</b></p>	<p>In relation to the fire and explosion at the Israeli Consulate, I make the following findings pursuant to s. 81(2) of the Act:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The fire and explosion occurred at approximately 1:55pm on 23 December 1982.</li> <li>b. The fire and explosion occurred at the Israeli Consulate which was then located on the seventh floor of 100 William Street, Sydney.</li> <li>c. The fire and explosion were caused by a gas-powered explosive device, which detonated in the stairwell adjacent to the fire exit door of the Israeli Consulate.</li> <li>d. The explosion caused a hole approximately 38cm by 25cm in the reinforced concrete at the top of the fire stairs.</li> <li>e. The device had been placed at the location subsequently evidenced by the hole in the stairwell.</li> <li>f. The bomb was initiated by a time-delay mechanism (which allowed the person who placed it to escape).</li> </ol> <p>In relation to the fire and explosion at the Hakoah Club, I make the following findings pursuant to s. 81(2) of the Act:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. The fire and explosion occurred at approximately 6:45pm on 23 December 1982.</li> <li>b. The fire and explosion occurred in the car park of the Hakoah Club which was then located at 61-67 Hall Street, Bondi.</li> <li>c. The source of the explosion came from the boot of a green 1971 Chrysler Valiant sedan, which was parked on the middle level of the car park.</li> <li>d. The bomb created a large fireball that caused significant damage to both the Hakoah Club building and other cars in the area.</li> <li>e. The device malfunctioned and, although it exploded, it did not detonate in the way intended.</li> <li>f. The bomb had included two LPG cylinders and plastic drums filled with petrol. This additional component was apparently intended to accelerate the fragmentation and fireball effect of the explosive to make it larger and cause more damage.</li> </ol>
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	<p>g. As the device did not detonate properly, parts of the bomb were recovered from the scene, including two electric detonators, insulated wiring, two LPG cylinders, metal drums and AAA batteries, and these parts were able to be forensically examined.</p> <p>Further, I find that both explosions were an act of international terrorism perpetrated by the May 15 terrorist organisation with the assistance of one or more local supporters. I find that the two bombs were constructed outside Australia by May 15's leader and founder, Hussayn Al-Umari (also known as Abu Ibrahim), and that he directed that the attacks take place.</p>
<p><b>Recommendations</b></p>	<p><b>To the Commissioner of the NSW Police Force:</b></p> <p>The NSW Police Force liaise with the Forensic &amp; Analytical Science Service (FASS) to consider the appropriateness and timing of retesting exhibits having regard to developments in DNA technology available at FASS and other laboratories.</p>
<p><b>Non-publication orders</b></p>	<p>Various orders were made on 5 and 6 December 2022 prohibiting the publication and/or disclosure of certain information and evidence contained within the brief of evidence and other documents tendered during the hearing. A copy of the orders can be obtained from the Coroners Court Registry.</p>

## Table of Contents

Introduction .....	5
The role of the Coroner .....	5
The inquiry .....	6
Background .....	7
The bombing at the Israeli Consulate .....	7
The bombing at the Hakoah Club .....	9
The initial police investigation .....	10
Strike Force Forbearance .....	12
The circumstances of the explosions .....	13
Terrorism and the geopolitical landscape in 1982 .....	13
The threat of terrorism in Australia in the 1980s .....	15
The May 15 terrorist organisation .....	15
Whether the bombings were an act of terrorism .....	17
The link between the explosions at the Israeli Consulate and Hakoah Club.....	18
Whether there is sufficient evidence against a known person to require referral of the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions .....	22
Further investigation relating to DNA evidence .....	22
Conclusion .....	24
Findings.....	24
Recommendations .....	25

## Introduction

1. On 5, 6 and 8 December 2022, I conducted a general inquiry into the fire and explosions at the Israeli Consulate in Sydney and the Hakoah Club in Bondi on 23 December 1982.
2. The Israeli Consulate blast occurred at about 1.55pm on Thursday, 23 December 1982 in the 25 storey office building at 100 William Street in Sydney. The Israeli Consulate and the fire escape area received most of the damage from the explosion – although extensive damage was also caused to surrounding floors. Although significant injuries arose, fortunately there were no deaths.
3. The Hakoah Club bombing occurred almost 5 hours later, at around 6.45pm on the same day, when an improvised explosive device (“IED”) detonated in an underground car park of the Hakoah Club, then located at 61-67 Hall Street in Bondi. Extensive damage was caused by the blast, but fortunately, no injuries or deaths ensued.

## The role of the Coroner

4. Section 30(2) of the *Coroners Act 2009* (NSW) (“the Act”) provides that a coroner has jurisdiction to hold a general inquiry concerning a fire or explosion that has destroyed or damaged any property within the State, but only if the State Coroner gives a direction for such inquiry to be held.
5. Section 30(3) of the Act provides that the coroner’s jurisdiction extends to the examination of “all of the circumstances concerning the fire or explosion (including, but not limited to, an examination of its cause and origin)”.
6. Section 32(3) and (4) of the Act provides as follows:
  - “(3) **General inquiries** A coroner is required to hold a general inquiry concerning a fire or explosion that has destroyed or damaged property within the State if the State Coroner gives a direction under this section for such a general inquiry to be held.
  - (4) The State Coroner must direct that a coroner hold a general inquiry concerning a fire or explosion that has destroyed or damaged property within the State if—
    - (a) an authorised public official has made a request to the State Coroner for a general inquiry to be held, or
    - (b) the State Coroner is of the opinion that a general inquiry should be held.”
7. On 16 September 2019, I directed that a general inquiry take place pursuant to s. 32(3) of the Act.
8. Pursuant to s. 81(2) of the Act, a coroner who conducts an inquiry concerning a fire or explosion must, at its conclusion, record their findings as to the date, place and circumstances of the fire or explosion.

## The inquiry

9. The Inquiry took place very close to the 40 year anniversary of the date of the events on 23 December 1982 and was heard over three days at the Coroners Court at Lidcombe on 5, 6 and 8 December 2022. The findings are delivered on the date of the 40 year anniversary.
10. The Court received a significant amount of documentary evidence as well as oral evidence from three witnesses:
  - a. Detective Chief Inspector Caroline O’Hare (“DCI O’Hare”), the officer-in-charge of Strike Force Forbearance (“SF Forbearance”);
  - b. Retired Supervisory Special Agent Denny Lee Kline (“SSA Kline”) from the United States (“US”) Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) who worked in the Explosives Unit of the FBI Laboratory. SSA Kline was the lead examiner for the Hakoah Club device and is also an internationally recognised explosives expert who has been involved in the investigation of over 300 bombing incidents in the US and at least 11 foreign countries; and
  - c. Professor Bruce Hoffman, a professor at Georgetown University and a Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism & Homeland Security for the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC. Professor Hoffman is one of the world’s leading experts on terrorism and counter terrorism.
11. The two bombings on that day had the potential to cause catastrophic harm. In the event, it was sheer luck that the explosion at the Hakoah Club in particular, did not properly detonate. Had it done so, many lives may have been lost. The bombings constituted a targeted attack on a section of the Australian community.
12. Against that backdrop, the inquiry served an important function: namely, to provide continued recognition of the significance of the events of 23 December 1982 and, if justified by the evidence, to attribute responsibility for the attacks by identifying the key person, namely the bomb maker and director of the attack, and the associated terrorist organisation involved.
13. The central focus of the inquiry was to enable relevant evidence collated by senior NSW police officers comprising SF Forbearance to be received to facilitate this Court’s consideration of the relevant events, in light of the expert evidence obtained.
14. The issues that were considered at the inquiry were as follows:

“Having regard to ss. 30(3) and 81(2) of the *Coroners Act 2009*, the issues to be explored by this general inquiry include the following:

  1. The circumstances, including the cause and origin, of the explosion on the 7th floor of 100 William Street Sydney, at around 1:55pm on 23 December 1982;

2. The circumstances, including the cause and origin, of the explosion at the Hakoah Club, 61-67 Hall Street Bondi, at around 6:45pm on 23 December 1982;
3. Confirmation of the date and place of the explosions;
4. Whether, and to what extent, the two explosions were linked;
5. Whether there is sufficient evidence against a known person (or persons), to require referral of the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions, in accordance with s. 78 of the *Coroners Act 2009*.”

## **Background**

15. In their opening and closing submissions, Counsel Assisting provided a detailed summary of the evidence before the Court. I accept Counsel Assisting’s summary of the evidence as accurate and reproduce much of it below.

### ***The bombing at the Israeli Consulate***

16. The bombing at the Israeli Consulate in Sydney occurred at approximately 1:55pm. A gas-powered explosive device detonated in the stairwell adjacent to the fire exit door of the Consulate.
17. The Israeli Consulate was located on the seventh floor of 100 William Street in Sydney. Its location was well known in the community and in the period leading up to late 1982, it was the frequent site of protest activity, including by ideological groups espousing anti-Israeli ideology.
18. In this respect, at the time, the NSW Police Force had a specialised unit known as the Special Branch, which, among other things, investigated politically motivated violence. Special Branch documents record that a number of protests against Israeli interests culminated outside the Consulate.
19. From June 1982, protest activity outside the Consulate intensified following the invasion of southern Lebanon by Israeli military forces (in June 1982), and especially following what has been referred to, historically, as the Sabra and Shatila massacre on 16 September 1982 carried out by Christian Lebanese militia (and for which some persons regard Israel as bearing responsibility).
20. On 23 December 1982, at around 12:30pm, the Vice Consul for the Israeli Consulate who was responsible for its security conducted a security check of the area surrounding the Consulate, including the fire stairs beside the Consulate, and determined that everything was in order.
21. At the time, the office building which housed the Israeli Consulate did not have any security cameras. The fire doors were only accessible via the internal corridors on each floor and could not be opened from within the fire stairwell. Further, the fire doors on the seventh floor were alarmed and monitored by the Israeli Consulate. The building also

employed two security guards who worked from 7:00am to 10:00pm. A security company operated after those hours.

22. At approximately 1:55pm that day, an explosive device detonated in the stairwell adjacent to the Consulate. Police were alerted to the bombing at 1:57pm by a triple zero call from an employee of a jeweller that was also located on level 7. This message was broadcast by Police radio at 1:58pm.
23. At the time of the explosion, a number of Consulate staff were present in the Consulate, although the Israeli Consulate General was not.
24. A 70-year-old tea lady was working in the Israeli Consulate at the time. She suffered severe injuries, including a fractured skull, four broken ribs, a broken leg and bruising. She spent considerable time in intensive care and, fortunately, survived the attack.
25. A man who was working in an insurance agency on the sixth floor of the building was thrown across the room by the force of the explosion. It was extremely fortunate that he did not suffer serious injuries. Persons inside the building at the time described feeling the building shake and said that it was like an earthquake.
26. The crime scene examination was overseen by Detective Sergeant Gibson ("DS Gibson") of the NSW Police Force Ballistics Unit. DS Gibson observed a hole approximately 38cm by 25cm in the reinforced concrete at the top of the fire stairs. DS Gibson considered that the device had been placed at the location occupied by the hole in the stairwell.
27. It appeared that the fire door had been closed at the time of the explosion but was demolished by the force of the blast. The fire doors from the ground floor to the 11<sup>th</sup> floor had been blown in or damaged, and many of the adjacent rooms had suffered severe damage. Various photographs depicting the extensive damage to the building were received into evidence.
28. It was also apparent that the fire door locks had been interfered with by way of two pieces of paper – including from a 'Tally Ho' cigarette paper packet – preventing the ground floor fire doors from locking and allowing access to the fire stairs from the ground floor.
29. Brigadier Mackenzie-Orr of the Australian Army prepared a post-blast examination report which noted a number of significant observations about the placement of the bomb. In his view, the explosion at the Israeli Consulate was caused by a quantity of explosive material that was initiated by a time-delay mechanism. The explosion was extensive, and none of the remnants of the device could be recovered from the scene by bomb investigators after the events.
30. Brigadier Mackenzie-Orr estimated that the bomb used comprised a relatively small and easily concealed package. He noted that the fire stairs were easily accessed from the street and the detonation was likely operated by a clockwork or electronic time delay mechanism.



### ***The bombing at the Hakoah Club***

31. The second bombing occurred at approximately 6:45pm in the parking area at the Hakoah Club, which was then located at 61-67 Hall Street in Bondi.
32. It was an extensive building, which included a gaming area, bars, lounges, food areas, a pool, gymnasium, and a ballroom. The club was served by a three-storey carpark, which comprised 89 spaces (as well as spaces for the executives of the club). Entrants to the carpark had to produce their membership badge – although it appears this requirement was not strictly enforced. A vehicle would then be directed to the appropriate level where a vacant spot could be found. Vehicles that remained overnight in the carpark had their registration recorded.
33. In the afternoon of 23 December 1982, staff at the Hakoah Club were aware of the explosion at the Israeli Consulate earlier in the day and, as a result, had placed an additional security guard at the entrance to the car park. A particular security officer was instructed to conduct a security sweep of the carpark at around 2:30pm. When later shown where the explosion had taken place, he did not recall a vehicle being parked there or anything else suspicious.
34. Another security guard commenced his shift at 3:30pm, after arriving at the club at 3:00pm. He parked on the lower level because every other level was full. He did not observe the Valiant sedan in which the explosive was placed entering the carpark during his shift. From this it may be inferred that the Valiant was driven into the carpark prior to 3:00pm.
35. At around 3:50pm, a club member parked her car on the lower level of the carpark and walked to the club entrance on the middle level. She noticed three men standing at the boot of what she later described as a large grey vehicle, but did not raise concerns with staff.
36. At approximately 6:45pm, an explosive device detonated in the car park of the Hakoah Club. The explosion came from the boot of a green 1971 Chrysler Valiant sedan, which was parked on the middle level of the car park.
37. The general manager of the Hakoah Club was driving his vehicle on the middle level at the time of the explosion. He heard and felt the explosion, getting out of his vehicle at the exit. Around this time the general manager heard a loud hissing noise, followed by further explosions of less severity or intensity.
38. Other witnesses recall seeing black smoke and hearing the loud hissing noise prior to the subsequent explosions.
39. The explosion created a fireball that caused significant damage to the Valiant sedan, as well as to a BMW sedan and a Holden Gemini parked on either side of the car.
40. At 6:50pm, NSW Police were notified and the NSW Fire Brigade was alerted at 6:54pm. On arrival, the fire was at an “advanced” stage, and the carpark was evacuated.

41. Forensic examination of the bomb site was again overseen by DS Gibson. As the IED appeared to have malfunctioned, and the explosion did not occur to the degree planned, investigators were able to recover a number of items from the site of the explosion. This included two electric detonators, insulated wiring, two LPG cylinders, metal drums and AAA batteries.
42. DS Gibson concluded that the construction of this bomb was similar to the device used at 100 William Street.
43. Brigadier Mackenzie-Orr also prepared a post-blast examination report for this explosion. Significantly, he concluded that the amount of fuel in the LPG cylinders could have destroyed the Hakoah Club if it had been properly utilised. In his view, this suggested that, in effect, the implementation of the device on scene had not been by a professional terrorist organisation.
44. He also suggested that the device recovered from the Hakoah Club appeared to operate in a very similar fashion to the device that would have been used in the earlier bombing that day at the Israeli Consulate. In particular, the apparent lack of explosion knowledge (as to the implementation of the device), and the similarity of the time-delay devices led to this conclusion.
45. As noted, despite malfunctioning, the explosion nevertheless caused extensive damage to the Hakoah Club. Various photographs depicting the damage to the Valiant sedan, surrounding vehicles and the carpark were received into evidence.
46. Had the device detonated properly, it could have destroyed the entire building – likely resulting in a catastrophic loss of life. At the time, there were around 100 to 150 people inside the Hakoah Club including participants involved in the Maccabi Junior sporting carnival being held in Sydney.

### ***The initial police investigation***

47. In the aftermath of the explosions, phone calls were received by both media outlets and the NSW Police Force from persons purporting to claim responsibility for the attacks on behalf of certain organisations. Those calls were investigated and not ultimately considered credible.
48. The initial police response to the explosions included, amongst other matters, the attendance of Army personnel and dogs, a bomb search of the building, crime scene examination and photograph, and the collection of various exhibits.
49. On 12 May 1983, Detective Sergeant Richard Barber (“DS Barber”) transported various exhibits from the Hakoah Club device to the FBI Laboratory in Washington DC for examination. It was determined that various components of device matched components of two other devices, specifically a device that exploded on Pan American Airways Flight 830 which was travelling from Tokyo to Honolulu and another device that was found on Pan American Airways Flight 441 in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. While it was determined that

the devices were constructed by the same individual or individuals using the same bomb-making instructions, at that time, the bomb-maker was not identified.

50. Police also made various enquiries in relation to the green 1971 Chrysler Valiant sedan that was used in the Hakoah Club bombing. It was ascertained that the vehicle was purchased from a second-hand car dealership in Burwood.
51. The proprietors of the car dealership identified three possible operatives in the purchase of the car. A young car salesman provided a description of the first man who attended the car yard on Tuesday 14 December 1982, and who had identified himself as a "David Hoffman" (being the name used to purchase the car). The name and the address that he provided was later discovered to be false. He was described as either Greek or Italian, in his early 40s with a very dark complexion and black wavy hair. This man was joined by a second male who was also described as Greek or Italian with a dark complexion, black thick frizzy hair, and a slim build. On Wednesday 22 December 1982, the car was subsequently picked up from the dealership by a woman in her thirties of foreign appearance (possibly Lebanese) with olive complexion and a well-educated voice. The witnesses assisted in the preparation of "penri facial makeups" of the persons they described. A penri facial makeup is a series of photographic and hand draw images depicting various facial features that are put together by a witness with a view to developing an accurate image of the subject person they are describing. The three penri facial makeups were released to the media and were included in the reward posters published in 2013 and 2022.
52. There was also an eyewitness account from the Hakoah Club shortly before the bombing to suggest that three men were seen standing in the vicinity of the Valiant in the lead up to the explosion.
53. Police investigations then focussed upon a known person, who in 1983 was charged with being "an accessory before the fact to maliciously placing an explosive substance in a building with intent to destroy or damage that building".
54. On 23 June 1983, committal proceedings against the known person commenced in the Court of Petty Sessions. The known person was committed for trial on 16 December 1983. However, on 3 August 1984, the charges were not billed by the then Attorney General.
55. Since 1984, no further persons have been charged in connection with either of the explosions. However, Police continue to suspect that these two bombings were acts of international terrorism carried out by foreign operatives with the assistance of persons who resided in Australia
56. Although there was an extensive investigation at the time, both bombings remain unsolved.

### ***Strike Force Forbearance***

57. In 2010, DCI O'Hare, Commander of the Strategy and Education Units within the Counter Terrorism & Special Tactics Command of the NSW Police Force, identified a number of lines of inquiry in relation to the two explosions.
58. In February 2011, SF Forbearance was established to conduct a comprehensive review of the NSWPF holdings in relation to the two explosions and to assess the possibility of commencing a cold case investigation into the attacks. In about February or March 2011, the investigation commenced. This was done under the auspices of the NSW Joint Counter Terrorism Team ("JCTT") with the NSW Police Force as the lead agency. The JCTT is comprised of members from the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation and the NSW Crime Commission. Detective Chief Inspector Dr David Gawel ("DCI Gawel") was appointed as the officer in charge of SF Forbearance.
59. In 2012, DCI Gawel and DCI O'Hare travelled to Washington DC, to speak with members of the FBI and the US Department of Justice regarding their holdings in connection with the May 15 Organisation, and to confer with various FBI agents, including retired Special Agents Stuart Case and Denny Kline and also FBI bomb examiner, Tom Mohnal (now deceased).
60. Investigations undertaken by SF Forbearance in Australia included the re-interview of various witnesses, and also the interviewing of persons not previously interviewed, for various reasons, in the original investigation.
61. The investigation was difficult and complex, not least because of the antiquity of the relevant events, but also due to the unfortunate destruction of the original brief of evidence. It was established that a retired police officer had been granted permission to remove the brief from State Archives to assist with research for a book relating to the bombings. Unfortunately, the retired police officer was killed in a tragic car accident, and it is believed that the original brief was subsequently mistakenly destroyed.
62. Nevertheless, SF Forbearance uncovered a significant volume of relevant material, including some original documents and statements, details of witnesses, copies of statements, running sheets and photographs. Additionally, the key original exhibits, including componentry and fragments from the IED used in the Hakoah Club bombing, remain available and have been particularly informative.
63. Between 2011 and 2013, DNA profiling tests were performed on a number of the items recovered from both crime scenes. The results of the testing were reported in a Certificate of Analysis by Dr David Bruce of the Forensic & Analytical Science Services ("FASS") dated 5 November 2013.
64. On 6 June 2013, the NSW Government announced a \$100,000 reward for information relating to the two bombings.

65. In 2016, DCI Gawel and DCI O'Hare attended a meeting with the then State Coroner, Magistrate Barnes, and made a formal request for an inquiry into the fires that resulted from the explosions at the Israeli Consulate and Hakoah Club.
66. On 6 July 2018, the then State Coroner, Magistrate Mabbut, directed that a brief of evidence be prepared.
67. On 16 September 2019, I directed that a general inquiry into the fires and explosions at the Israeli Consulate and Hakoah Club take place.
68. Further DNA profiling was performed on 2019 on a number of retained DNA samples with the results reported in a Certificate of Analysis by Dr Bruce dated 19 August 2022.
69. On 15 December 2020, DCI O'Hare became the officer in charge of SF Forbearance and the various investigations continued.
70. On the morning of 5 December 2022 just prior to the commencement of this inquiry, the NSW Government announced an increase in the reward for information which leads to the arrest and conviction of any person responsible for the bombings to \$1 million.
71. The NSW police investigators from SF Forbearance have worked diligently, and with significant success, in their efforts to assist in providing answers to questions that have been otherwise unresolved prior to the cold case investigation and the holding of this inquiry

### **The circumstances of the explosions**

72. To assist in understanding the circumstances of the explosions, Professor Bruce Hoffman was retained to provide expert evidence relating to the threat of terrorism and the geopolitical landscape at the time of the explosions. Professor Hoffman prepared two detailed expert reports for this inquiry, which was supplemented by oral evidence on 8 December 2022. The focus of Professor Hoffman's evidence was on:
  - a. the international landscape of terrorism around the time of the explosions;
  - b. the context of the threat of terrorism faced by Australia at the relevant time; and
  - c. information regarding the May 15 organisation.
73. The Court also received expert evidence in the form of a detailed statement and oral evidence from retired SSA Kline of the FBI, who examined components of the Hakoah Club device as well as various other similar devices.

### ***Terrorism and the geopolitical landscape in 1982***

74. Professor Hoffman defined terrorism as:

“The deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.”

75. Professor Hoffman explains that a terrorist act or event is qualitatively different from a criminal act or event. Although terrorists – like criminals – utilise violence as a means of achieving a specific end, the purpose or motivation behind a terrorist act differs from a criminal act, in that the:

“fundamental aim of the terrorist’s violence is ultimately to influence domestic or international politics, elucidate a profoundly held grievance, and draw attention to him – or herself and his or her cause: none of which is the concern or intention of the ordinary criminal.”
76. Professor Hoffman’s evidence provided extensive detail about the relevant geopolitical landscape in the early 1980s. Professor Hoffman explained that in June 1982, Israel launched “Operation Peace for Galilee” which featured an invasion of Lebanon with the stated aim of eliminating the ongoing threat to Israel from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (“PLO”). At that time, the PLO had been using Lebanon as a base from which to stage cross-border strikes against Israel for over a decade.
77. The Israeli invasion was prompted by an attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to the United Kingdom by a renegade Palestinian group that had splintered from the broader PLO. In response, Israel launched a ground and air strike on Lebanon, which led to the PLO being cornered in the north of Lebanon by about August of 1982.
78. However, relevant parties to the political situation, including Israel, were keen to ensure that moderate influences in the PLO (especially Chairman Yasser Arafat) maintained control within the PLO, especially when compared to what were regarded as other rogue groups, like the May 15 terrorist organisation. As a result, the United Nations sent an international peacekeeping force to oversee the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon.
79. Public sentiment towards Palestine reportedly changed following the massacre on 16 September 1982 of Sabra and Shatila refugees at refugee camps on the outskirts of Beirut by Christian Maronite militiamen. Many persons regarded Israel as responsible for these attacks. Within Israel, large protests occurred in Tel Aviv. The events were said to have “sent shock waves reverberating all the way to Washington”.
80. The Sabra and Shatila massacre led to an increase in attacks by Palestinian organisations, as well as non-Palestinian terrorist cells expressing solidarity. For the 12 month period from June 1982 to June 1983, there were around 90 terrorist attacks linked to Palestinian groups, including May 15 organisation. These attacks were connected to general anti-Israeli sentiment.
81. Following the Sabra and Shatila massacre, there was a significant increase in protest activity around the Sydney CBD and the Israeli Consulate.

### ***The threat of terrorism in Australia in the 1980s***

82. In terms of the domestic threat of terrorism faced by Australia around the time of the explosion, Professor Hoffman reports that Australia has never been completely free of terrorist attacks, and notes that a Current Issues Brief prepared in 1985 for the Australian Parliament explained that the number of terrorist groups and terrorist incidents in Australia began to increase after 1982.
83. The first annual report of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (“ASIO”), published in May 1984 was considered to be the first clear indication from official sources of the extent of the potential terrorist threat to Australia. Although that report generally considered the threat from terrorist groups to be low, it was correctly noted by ASIO that “Australia should no longer be seen as being immune from the influence of overseas terrorist groups, notably those from the Middle East.”
84. Further, the ASIO Report considered there to be a “very real danger that Australia might become an arena for terrorist attacks related to overseas political disputes in which Australia has no direct involvement.”

### ***The May 15 terrorist organisation***

85. Professor Hoffman provides detailed evidence about the May 15 terrorist organisation.
86. It was founded in 1978 or early 1979 by Husayn Muhammed Al-Umari also known as ‘Abu Ibrahim’. Al-Umari was born in Palestine in 1936, and had been a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – Special Operations Group (“PFLP–SOG”) which was an offshoot of its parent organisation, the PFLP. He founded May 15 following the death of Wadi Haddad, the leader of the PFLP. By that time, he had reportedly become disenchanted with what he regarded as the moderate views of the leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat. He formed the May 15 terrorist organisation to advance a more revolutionary stance.
87. As Professor Hoffman describes, the May 15 terrorist organisation was founded in vehement opposition to Israel and sought the defeat and destruction of the Jewish state. The USA, and any other country regarded as supporting Israel, were targets of May 15. In his oral evidence, Professor Hoffman emphasised that the May 15 terrorist organisation was, at the time, “one of the most active, most dangerous and most ruthless” of all terrorist organisations in the world (not just of Palestinian terrorist organisations). He further said that May 15 had an international focus and no hesitation in targeting innocent civilians and, indeed, deliberately sought to do so. What made May 15 so dangerous, Professor Hoffman said, was its professionalism and Al-Umari’s proficiency as a bomb-maker.
88. The May 15 organisation rapidly gained a reputation for carrying out effective attacks on aviation-related targets using highly sophisticated explosive devices. These operations were spearheaded by Al-Umari, who had studied chemical and electrical engineering and was described by counter-terrorism specialists as “the grandfather of bomb makers” and by Robert Baer (a highly experienced former officer of the US Central Intelligence

Agency, and who also provides an important report for the Inquiry) as no less than “the most capable and most dangerous bomb maker in the world”.

89. Al-Umari had reportedly devised a way to pass plastic explosive devices through airport security systems without being detected, and to conceal a bomb in the lining of a small suitcase.
90. Al-Umari is still wanted by the US Department of Justice. There is a US \$5m reward for his capture.
91. In his report, Professor Hoffman outlines numerous terrorist acts connected with May 15 during the period commencing from about January 1980, including:
  - a. 17 January 1980 – bombing of the Mount Royal Hotel in London;
  - b. 21 April 1980 – attempted bombing of an El Al Airlines flight in Zurich;
  - c. 27 July 1980 – hand grenade attack on a Jewish school in Antwerp, Belgium;
  - d. 31 December 1980 – bombing of a New Year’s Eve party at the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya;
  - e. 15 May 1981 – bombing of the El Al airlines offices in Rome, Italy;
  - f. 16 May 1981 – bombing of the El Al airlines offices in Istanbul, Turkey;
  - g. 10 August 1981 – bombing of the El Al airlines offices at Rome’s Leonard da Vinci Airport;
  - h. 10 August 1981 – bomb explosion near the Israeli Embassy in Athens, Greece;
  - i. 10 August 1981 – bomb explosion at the Israeli Embassy in Vienna, Austria;
  - j. 20 December 1981 – bomb explosion on a ship approaching Haifa, Israel harbour;
  - k. 9 January 1982 – bombing of the El Al Airlines office in Istanbul, Turkey;
  - l. 15 January 1982 – bombing of the Mifgash-Israel restaurant in West Berlin, Germany;
  - m. 9 August 1982 – attempted bombing of the Noga Hilton Hotel in Geneva Switzerland;
  - n. 11 August 1982 – bombing of Pan American Airways flight 830 en route from Tokyo to Honolulu;
  - o. 25 August 1982 – bomb discovered on Pan American Airways flight 441 departing Rio de Janeiro;
  - p. December 1983 – attempted bombing of three airliners while in flight, including two flights en route to Israel;
  - q. 5 January 1984 – attempted inflight bombing of an El Al Airlines flight en route from Tel Aviv to Athens;



- r. 6 April 1984 – attempted in flight bombing of a flight from Athens Greece to Tel Aviv, Israel;
  - s. 23 June 1984 – police in West Berlin raised an apartment and located two suitcases with explosives concealed in the suitcase linings;
  - t. 23 February 1985 – Bombing of the Paris branch of the Jewish-owned Marks and Spencer department store;
  - u. 21 August 1985 – Bombing of the Paris branch of the Israeli Bank Le’umi;
  - v. 15 October 1985 – Two terrorists were arrested in Rome carrying suitcase bombs which they planned to use to attack Israeli and US targets;
  - w. 13 February 1986 – Bombs linked to May 15 were found in the Gaza Strip;
  - x. May 1986 – An explosive device was located inside an attaché case at the main entrance to the British Embassy in Athens, Greece;
  - y. August 1986 – Four terrorists with suspected May 15 type explosives were arrested in Morocco; and
  - z. 19 September 1989 – bombing of UTA Airlines Flight 772 while en route from the People’s Republic of Congo to Chad.
92. Professor Hoffman states that May 15 was understood to be active from about 1978 to 1979 until 1983 and that no operations have been attributed definitively to the organisation since 1983; although several bombings that occurred after this suggest that its members remained active or had been absorbed into other terrorist organisations. The May 15 organisation is understood to have ceased existence in around 1984, after the US voiced objections to Iraqi support for the organisation, leading Baghdad to order the May 15 group to cease its operations.

***Whether the bombings were an act of terrorism***

93. Professor Hoffman gave evidence that the fundamental elements of terrorism or a terrorist event includes the following core elements:
- “a. ineluctably political in aims and motives;
  - b. violent – or, equally important, threatens violence;
  - c. designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target
  - d. conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological logical aims or example of some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders; and,
  - e. perpetrated by a subnational group or nonstate entity.”
94. Professor Hoffman opined, and I accept, that the bombings of the Israeli Consulate and the Hakoah Club meet the abovementioned criteria could be classified as “terrorist” events. He said the following in his report (and gave oral evidence to a similar effect):

“The targets of the attack – a diplomatic facility of a sovereign nation and a sports/social club specifically associated with people of a particular religion – evidence a clear political motivation. In these respects, the selection of both targets was clearly not random since a consulate is a representation of a foreign government and a Jewish social/sports club of a specific people’s religious faith. Both attacks conform to the core precepts of terrorism as an act of violence that is planned, premeditated, and purposeful. In this case, a bomb was constructed and its essential components acquired in advance of the attack. Even a modest amount of pre-attack surveillance and reconnaissance was required to determine the target’s accessibility and where the bombs could be placed without arousing suspicion, drawing attention to the perpetrator(s) or alerting the authorities. And, the intentionality of the attack’s purpose was served by destroying/damaging the targeted facility and harming anyone in the vicinity when the blasts occurred.

Like all acts of terrorism, the bombings were also designed to generate publicity and attention – in this case to reflect the perpetrator’s animus and enmity towards the state of Israel and the Jewish people as well. Further, the violent and threatening nature of the bombings are beyond doubt – conforming to the first and second criteria of terrorism described above. The bombings were also meant to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victims (the third criterion) as evidenced by a desire to situate this act within context of a political cause/grievance (opposition to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, its alleged persecution of the Palestinian people, and Israel’s country’s very existence), the intent to use the explosions as a platform for the communication of this message to a wider audience beyond the immediate targets, and in specific support of an existent terrorist organisation (the fourth and fifth criteria). The bombings may thus be seen as desiring to instil widespread fear and panic while transmitting an intended messages to a large audience.”

### ***The link between the explosions at the Israeli Consulate and Hakoah Club***

95. In 1982-1983, SSA Kline was working in the Explosives Unit of the FBI Laboratory. He examined various components of the Hakoah Club device and prepared a report for the NSW Police Force. SSA Kline recently prepared a detailed statement and gave oral evidence before the Court on 6 December 2022.
96. In 1983, as lead forensic examiner, SSA Kline assisted the NSW Police Force with a forensic examination of the componentry retrieved from the Hakoah Club device, including close analysis of the various fragments of wire, string, tape, metal and potting material. The examination was carried out in Washington DC. An essential part of SSA Kline’s examination was to compare the components retrieved from the Hakoah Club crime scene with componentry associated with other terrorism incidents.
97. SSA Kline gave evidence to the effect that relevant factors in identifying the bomb maker involved in a particular terrorist explosion included:
  - a. Fingerprint examination;
  - b. Matching of components within the device such as wiring, batteries and metallurgy;
  - c. The use of specific timing devices;

- d. The modus operandi of the bomb maker;
  - e. The types of explosives used;
  - f. The placement of explosives;
  - g. The method of concealment of the explosives in the device; and
  - h. The effect of the device.
98. In oral evidence, SSA Kline confirmed such factors can assist in identifying a bomb maker, constituting in effect a unique bomb maker's signature or fingerprint.
99. Key features of SSA Kline's evidence (as set out in his report and oral evidence) include the following:
- a. The use of a particular timing device was part of the 'signature' of bomb-maker Al-Umari. Al-Umari was the only known bomb-maker to use this particular timing device.
  - b. Components from the device used in the Hakoah Club bombing matched components from an unexploded IED located in Rio De Janeiro on board Pan Am Flight 441 on 25 August 1982.
  - c. This device was also matched the IED used in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 830 enroute from Tokyo to Honolulu on 11 August 1982.
  - d. This device also matched an unexploded suitcase bomb that was surrendered to police in Switzerland on 9 August 1982. The bomber advised investigators that the suitcase IED had been given to him by Al-Umari and he was told to bomb a hotel in Geneva. He provided investigators with details of the group and that it operated out of Baghdad, Iraq. As part of an investigative technique, the bomber was told to inform Al-Umari that he had run out of money and needed more money to carry out the attack. As a result, another member of the May 15 organisation, who acted as a courier for Al-Umari, was sent to Switzerland to give money to the bomber. The courier carried a gym bag which had a liner of maroon vinyl, which was partially missing. SSA Kline was sent to Switzerland in 1984 to examine the device. He matched the maroon vinyl from the gym bag carried by the courier with the maroon vinyl wrapper contained in the Pan Am Flight 441 device which was found in Rio De Janeiro. SSA Kline concluded that both bombs had come from the same source. SSA Kline also gave evidence that the components of this device were almost identical to the devices used in Sydney, Rio De Janeiro and Honolulu.
  - e. The timing device componentry from all of these devices matched and the IEDs were all made by the same source.
100. SSA Kline gave evidence that prior to the investigation into the suitcase IED that was surrendered in Switzerland, investigators were only aware that the IEDs used in Pan Am

Flight 830, Pan Am Flight 441 and the Hakoah Club were made by the same person but were not aware of the identity of that person. SSA Kline gave evidence that it was the investigation into the suitcase IED surrendered in Switzerland which resulted in Hussayn Al-Umari (also known as Abu Ibrahim) being identified as the bomb-maker for all of the devices.

101. In his report and oral evidence, Mr Kline also identified further matters indicating that the bomb used in the Hakoah Club bombing was made by Al-Umari, namely:

- a. In 1973, three unexploded IEDs were discovered in three rental vehicles located in New York during the visit of then Israeli Prime Minister Golda Mier. One of those IEDs had the same type of timing device that was used in the Hakoah Club bomb. At that time, Al-Umari was the only person using that particular timing device.
- b. One of the IEDs discovered in New York contained features and characteristics also reflected in the circumstances of the Hakoah Club bombing.

102. SSA Kline gave evidence to the effect that Al-Umari was responsible for at least 21 international bombings and that the construction of his bombs were:

“so singularly unique, that the identification of his ‘bombers signature’ was the most positive [that he] had encountered”.

103. Ultimately, based upon the analysis described above, SSA Kline concluded that the bombings at the Israeli Consulate and Hakoah Club in Sydney were connected to the May 15 series of bombings and that Al-Umari and the May 15 terrorist organisation carried out the bombings with the assistance of local supporters.

104. Additional evidence received by this Court on the link between the two explosions is to the following effect:

- a. DS Barber prepared an incident report for the Australian Bomb Data Centre in which he suggested a link between the two methods of ignition used in the two explosions. DS Barber was the officer who conveyed components of the Hakoah Club device to the FBI. He indicated that from an examination of the various components and photographs of the devices from the Hakoah Club, Pan Am Flight 830 and Pan Am Flight 441 that they were constructed by the same person.
- b. DS Gibson, the NSW Police Force Ballistics officer who attended the crime scene for both explosions, concluded that the construction of the Hakoah Club bomb was similar to the device used at the Israeli Consulate.
- c. Brigadier Mackenzie-Orr prepared a post-blast examination report for each explosion. He suggested that the device recovered from the Hakoah Club appeared to operate in a very similar fashion to the device used in the earlier bombing that day at the Israeli Consulate. In particular, the apparent lack of explosion knowledge, and the similarity of the time-delay devices led to this conclusion.

- d. DCI Gawel, the former officer in charge of SF Forbearance, opined that at least two particular timing devices were transported to Australia and that the bombing was carried out by at least three local conspirators.
  - e. DCI O'Hare told the Court that, inter alia, the forensic and circumstantial evidence pointed to the two explosions being connected, including having regard to the intended targets (the Jewish community in Sydney); the sheer unlikelihood of two international terrorist attacks occurring on the same day against the same targets (which was unprecedented in her experience), as well as the evidence of SSA Kline as to the modus operandi of May 15 and Al-Umari.
105. Ultimately, having regard to the combined force of the evidence described above and, in particular, the evidence of Professor Hoffman and retired SSA Kline, I am satisfied that each of the explosions at the Israeli Consulate and Hakoah Club was an instance of international terrorism. I am satisfied that both bombings were linked given the temporal and relative geographic proximity of the explosions, the circumstances of the explosions, and the intended targets.
106. I am satisfied that the evidence establishes that key aspects of the explosive devices were made offshore by Hussayn Al-Umari (also known as Abu Ibrahim), the leader of the May 15 terrorist organisation and a prolific bomb-maker, and that he masterminded the attacks. In this respect, Professor Hoffman gave evidence that he was initially of the view that there was strong and credible evidence that May 15 (and Al-Umari) was the most likely perpetrator of the Sydney bombings. This was based on the pattern of activity of international terrorism at the time and the intended targets (i.e., Israeli and Jewish interests). Professor Hoffman confirmed that he had recently been provided with the statement of SSA Kline dated 3 August 2022. Professor Hoffman described SSA Kline's statement as "very compelling" and effectively "dispositive" of the question of who carried out the Sydney bombings such that the May 15 terrorist organisation and Al-Umari could fairly be regarded as the perpetrator.
107. I also accept that Al-Umari and the May 15 terrorist organisation received assistance and support from one or more Australian-based supporters who arranged for the placement and detonation of the bombs. In this respect, Professor Hoffman gave evidence to the effect that international terrorist organisations, such as May 15, cannot operate without local support because they do not know the local environment. They rely on local supporters for the necessary cultural knowledge and awareness to assist them to navigate through societies with which they are unfamiliar as well as for logistical assistance (such as providing apartments, renting cars and so on). Professor Hoffman considered that local support is "absolutely critical" for the survival of terrorist organisations and provides them with an international reach.

## **Whether there is sufficient evidence against a known person to require referral of the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions**

108. Section 78 of the Act relevantly provides as follows:

- “(1) This section applies in relation to any of the following inquests or inquiries—
- ...
- (b) an inquest or inquiry if, at any time during the course of the inquest or inquiry, the coroner forms the opinion (having regard to all of the evidence given up to that time) that—
- (i) the evidence is capable of satisfying a jury beyond reasonable doubt that a known person has committed an indictable offence, and
- (ii) there is a reasonable prospect that a jury would convict the known person of the indictable offence, and
- (iii) the indictable offence would raise the issue of whether the known person caused the death, suspected death, fire or explosion with which the inquest or inquiry is concerned.
- ...
- (3) If this section applies to an inquest or inquiry as provided by subsection (1)(b), the coroner may—
- (a) continue the inquest or inquiry and record under section 81(1) or (2) the coroner’s findings or, if there is a jury, the verdict of the jury, or
- (b) suspend the inquest or inquiry and, if there is a jury, discharge the jury.
- (4) The coroner is required to forward to the Director of Public Prosecutions—
- (a) the depositions taken at an inquest or inquiry to which this section applies, and
- (b) in the case of an inquest or inquiry referred to in subsection (1)(b)—a written statement signed by the coroner that specifies the name of the known person and the particulars of the indictable offence concerned.”

109. As set out in the background above, charges were brought against a known person in February 1983. Following committal proceedings in the Court of Petty Sessions, the known person was committed for trial. However, the charges were eventually not billed by the then Attorney General.

110. Counsel Assisting submitted that, at this point in time, there is insufficient evidence against a known person (or persons), to require referral of the matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions under s. 78 of the Act.

111. I agree with Counsel Assisting’s submission. However, this position may conceivably change in future following further investigation by the NSW Police Force (and in light of the \$1m reward offered for information that leads to the arrest and conviction of any persons responsible for the bombings) and with advances in DNA technology.

### **Further investigation relating to DNA evidence**

112. With a view to ensuring all relevant avenues of investigation were explored, Dr Jonathan Whitaker, Consultant Forensic Scientist, was retained to review the relevant holdings of SF Forbearance relating to DNA testing. Dr Whitaker is an internationally renowned forensic DNA specialist, who has practiced as a forensic scientist for over 30 years

specialising in the field of DNA profiling. Dr Whitaker prepared a comprehensive report dated 2 November 2022.

113. Dr Whitaker acknowledged that samples recovered from the Hakoah Club explosion are challenging in terms of further DNA testing, noting the small component parts are now over 40 years old. Further, for the majority of samples, the very low levels of DNA recovered limited the testing that could be undertaken.
114. However, Dr Whitaker identified a number of further opportunities for DNA testing including:
  - a. The application of current technologies to untested items, or to the remains of any DNA extracted from previously tested exhibits, to try and improve the results to date and potentially provide new intelligence leads; and
  - b. The potential for database, familial and forensic genetic genealogy searches to provide further intelligence as to persons of interest.
115. Dr Bruce prepared a supplementary report dated 2 December 2022 in response to matters raised by Dr Whitaker as to further testing. In short, Dr Bruce's supplementary report noted, inter alia, that:
  - a. A number of exhibits were not examined (for reasons which were unknown, including potentially because of the quality of the exhibit, or that the item was unsuitable for sampling for DNA). Dr Bruce stated that the "exhibits in question can be re-submitted for review and evidence recovery if required".
  - b. While certain exhibits could be further reviewed by FASS, the relevant extraction methods referred to were not validated methods for FASS.
  - c. Certain samples which gave an 'undetermined' result for DNA quantitation were not progressed for DNA profiling giving the protocols of FASS; however, the DNA extracts "are stored and can be tested if required".
116. Dr Bruce concluded that:

"The samples recovered from the items in this case have all been tested to the limits of technology currently available at NSW FASS. A DNA sample has also been taken by the NSW Police to a service provider in the United States for further specialised testing ... However, as new technology evolves and is validated for use in our laboratories this case can continue to be reviewed in the future to attempt to improve the DNA results from the samples".

117. Counsel Assisting submitted that given that further potential DNA analysis may be possible and noting the ongoing developments in DNA testing technology, I could appropriately make a recommendation to the Commissioner of the NSW Police Force in the following terms:

“The NSW Police Force liaise with the Forensic & Analytical Science Service (FASS) to consider the appropriateness and timing of retesting exhibits having regard to developments in DNA technology available at FASS and other laboratories.”

118. The Commissioner was provided with an opportunity to respond to the proposed recommendation and, on 7 December 2022, indicated that she supported the recommendation.
119. In light of the evidence of Dr Whitaker and Dr Bruce, I am satisfied that it is desirable for a recommendation to be made in the terms proposed by Counsel Assisting.

## **Conclusion**

120. This inquiry is important to both to the victims of the bombings at the Israeli Consulate and the Hakoah Club and the community generally because it serves to make an official record of the potentially catastrophic events on 23 December 1982. This is underscored by the evidence of DCI O'Hare who indicated that she spoke to some of the victims of the bombings and noted that their grief and distress at the bombings was evident despite the passage of time.
121. I commend DCI O'Hare and Dr Gawel for their expertise and dedication to this investigation and their preparation of such a comprehensive brief of evidence. I would also like to thank my assisting team, Dr David Kell SC and Ms Emma Sullivan of counsel and their instructing solicitor, David Yang from the Crown Solicitor's Office. They too performed an extraordinary task with such professionalism and skill.

## **Findings**

122. In relation to the fire and explosion at the Israeli Consulate, I make the following findings pursuant to s. 81(2) of the Act:
- a. The fire and explosion occurred at approximately 1:55pm on 23 December 1982.
  - b. The fire and explosion occurred at the Israeli Consulate which was then located on the seventh floor of 100 William Street, Sydney.
  - c. The fire and explosion were caused by a gas-powered explosive device, which detonated in the stairwell adjacent to the fire exit door of the Israeli Consulate.
  - d. The explosion caused a hole approximately 38cm by 25cm in the reinforced concrete at the top of the fire stairs.
  - e. The device had been placed at the location subsequently evidenced by the hole in the stairwell.
  - f. The bomb was initiated by a time-delay mechanism (which allowed the person who placed it to escape).



123. In relation to the fire and explosion at the Hakoah Club, I make the following findings pursuant to s. 81(2) of the Act:
- a. The fire and explosion occurred at approximately 6:45pm on 23 December 1982.
  - b. The fire and explosion occurred in the car park of the Hakoah Club which was then located at 61-67 Hall Street, Bondi.
  - c. The source of the explosion came from the boot of a green 1971 Chrysler Valiant sedan, which was parked on the middle level of the car park.
  - d. The bomb created a large fireball that caused significant damage to both the Hakoah Club building and other cars in the area.
  - e. The device malfunctioned and, although it exploded, it did not detonate in the way intended.
  - f. The bomb had included two LPG cylinders and plastic drums filled with petrol. This additional component was apparently intended to accelerate the fragmentation and fireball effect of the explosive to make it larger and cause more damage.
  - g. As the device did not detonate properly, parts of the bomb were recovered from the scene, including two electric detonators, insulated wiring, two LPG cylinders, metal drums and AAA batteries, and these parts were able to be forensically examined.
124. Further, I find that both explosions were an act of international terrorism perpetrated by the May 15 terrorist organisation with the assistance of one or more local supporters. I find that the two bombs were constructed outside Australia by May 15's leader and founder, Hussayn Al-Umari (also known as Abu Ibrahim), and that he directed that the attacks take place.

## **Recommendations**

125. Section 82 of the Act enables a coroner to make recommendations that are considered "necessary or desirable" in relation to any matter connected with the fire or explosion.
126. For the reasons stated above, I make the following recommendation to the Commissioner of the NSW Police Force:
1. The NSW Police Force liaise with the Forensic & Analytical Science Service (FASS) to consider the appropriateness and timing of retesting exhibits having regard to developments in DNA technology available at FASS and other laboratories

I close this Inquiry.

Teresa O'Sullivan

State Coroner

Date: 23 December 2022