

**Bondi Junction Inquest**  
**Issues List (as at 8 April 2025)**

**NOTE: This Issues List is non-exhaustive, and provides an indication of the matters that will be the focus of the inquest hearing**

**A. Statutory findings under s 81 of the *Coroners Act 2009* (NSW)**

- 1 The statutory findings required under s 81 of the *Coroners Act 2009* (NSW) – namely, the identity of, and the date, place, manner, and cause of death of each of the deceased.
- 2 Related to (1), the chronology and circumstances of the events on 13 April 2024.

**B. Joel Cauchi**

- 3 Relevant background relating to Mr Cauchi, including the circumstances in which he came to move from Queensland to NSW in December 2023, and relevant events in the period prior to 13 April 2024.
- 4 What mental health condition(s) was Mr Cauchi suffering from on 13 April 2024, and the nexus (if any) to the events on that date.
- 5 Related to (4), Mr Cauchi's state of mind prior to and on 13 April 2024, including:
  - a. whether and to what extent (if any) there was identifiable motive(s) or planning; and
  - b. whether Mr Cauchi targeted any particular individuals or groups.
- 6 Whether treatment received by Mr Cauchi for his mental health condition(s) was adequate and appropriate, including, in particular:
  - a. the circumstances in which Mr Cauchi ceased the use of psychotropic medication to treat his mental health condition(s); and
  - b. the management of Mr Cauchi's mental health from February 2020 onwards, including any treatment(s) received.
- 7 Mr Cauchi's interactions with NSW and Queensland Police, and the status of his mental health at those times, including whether there were opportunities for early intervention in relation to those interactions.

**C. Response to events on 13 April 2024**

***Scentre Group and other subcontractors***

- 8 The nature and timing of the response of Scentre Group (and security subcontractors GLAD Group and Falcon Security) to the events on 13 April 2024, including:
  - a. the first point in time when staff in the CCTV/control room at Westfield Bondi Junction became aware of an active armed offender (**AAO**) in the centre;
  - b. the actions and timing of actions taken by security staff thereafter;
  - c. the communications as between security staff in relation to an AAO;

- d. the nature and timing of the alerts and alarms that followed;
- e. the nature and timing of evacuation instructions given to shoppers within the centre;
- f. the response of security guards within Westfield Bondi Junction to the AAO; and
- g. the nature of communications as between staff and emergency responders.

- 9 The adequacy of the response of Scentre Group (and security subcontractors GLAD Group and Falcon Security) to the events on 13 April 2024, including having regard to:
- a. the applicable policies and procedures for dealing with an AAO at Westfield Bondi Junction, and the currency and adequacy of such policies and procedures to deal with the events that occurred on 13 April 2024 (including having regard to the subcontracting of security services);
  - b. the training of relevant staff (including retail staff) within Westfield Bondi Junction to address the circumstances of an AAO (including the extent of any drills or scenario training);
  - c. the status of CCTV security monitoring at Westfield Bondi Junction and related procedures and policies;
  - d. the efficacy of the alarm and warning systems at Westfield Bondi Junction in the scenario of an AAO;
  - e. the adequacy of the training of security guards (including general security training, training for dealing with an AAO, first aid training, and any site-specific training);
  - f. the adequacy and appropriateness of equipment available to security guards in an AAO scenario (including protective and first aid equipment); and
  - g. the nature and adequacy of the subcontracting of security services at Westfield Bondi Junction to GLAD Group and Falcon Security.

***NSW Police Force (NSW Police)***

- 10 The circumstances in which Inspector Amy Scott discharged her firearm, leading to the death of Mr Cauchi, including whether such use of force was justified, reasonable and appropriate.
- 11 The nature and timing of the NSW Police response to the events on 13 April 2024, including:
- a. how and when NSW Police first became aware of an AAO at Westfield Bondi Junction;
  - b. the timing and response of NSW Police to emergency calls;
  - c. the nature of communications between NSW Police, Scentre Group staff (and subcontractors) and NSW Ambulance;
  - d. the nature and timing of any evacuation instructions given by NSW Police to shoppers within the centre;
  - e. the organisation and implementation of a command structure at Westfield Bondi Junction by NSW Police; and
  - f. whether there were impediments to the response by NSW Police.

- 12 The adequacy of the response of NSW Police to the events on 13 April 2024, including having regard to:
- a. applicable policies and procedures relevant to an AAO and/or mass casualty incident as it is unfolding, including whether those policies and procedures were complied with, and the adequacy of such policies and procedures to deal with the events that occurred on 13 April 2024;
  - b. the adequacy and appropriateness of equipment available to NSW Police (including in particular, whether NSW Police were suitably equipped to attend to injured victims);
  - c. the appropriateness and efficacy of any first-aid rendered by NSW Police;
  - d. the effectiveness of communications as between NSW Police and each of NSW Ambulance and Scentre Group;
  - e. the suitability of the command structure implemented by NSW Police at Westfield Bondi Junction; and
  - f. the identification of potential additional AAOs, including communications in respect of this and the dissemination of related information, and the impact this had (if any) on the response by NSW Police and NSW Ambulance; and
  - g. the adequacy and timing of communications with families of the deceased in the aftermath of events on 13 April 2024.

**NSW Ambulance**

- 13 The nature and timing of the NSW Ambulance response to the events on 13 April 2024, including:
- a. how and when NSW Ambulance became aware of the events at Westfield Bondi Junction;
  - b. the timing and response of NSW Ambulance to emergency calls;
  - c. the nature of communications between NSW Ambulance, Scentre Group staff (and subcontractors) and NSW Police;
  - d. the declaration of Bondi Junction Westfield as a 'hot zone' and the circumstances in which this occurred; and
  - e. whether there were impediments to the response by NSW Ambulance.
- 14 The adequacy of the response of NSW Ambulance to the events on 13 April 2024, including having regard to:
- a. applicable policies and procedures relevant to an AAO and/or mass casualty incident, including whether those policies and procedures were complied with and the adequacy of such policies and procedures to deal with the events that occurred on 13 April 2024;
  - b. the effectiveness of communications as between NSW Ambulance and each of NSW Police and Scentre Group;
  - c. the first aid provided and the treatment decisions of NSW Ambulance paramedics (including the adoption of 'mass casualty procedures'); and
  - d. the adequacy and appropriateness of equipment available to NSW Ambulance (including whether paramedics were equipped with appropriate equipment to respond to a mass casualty incident).

***Media reporting in the immediate aftermath of the events of 13 April 2024 and impact upon the families of the deceased***

- 15 The general nature and content of the media response (in de-identified form) to the events at Westfield Bondi Junction on 13 April 2024, including media reporting and media activities to obtain information, images and/or footage in the immediate aftermath.
- 16 The impact of the media reporting at [15] above upon the families of the deceased persons.

**D. Recommendations under s 82 of the Coroners Act 2009 (NSW)**

- 17 Pursuant to s 82 of the *Coroners Act 2009* (NSW), whether it is necessary or desirable to make any recommendations in relation to any of the following subject areas:
  - a. what, if any, alternatives are available or could be implemented for the treatment of persons suffering from chronic schizophrenia;
  - b. the extent to which there should or could be restrictions imposed on the sale of weapons (including Ka-Bar USMC utility knives and equivalents).
  - c. the utility or desirability of providing additional equipment to security contractors (whether offensive or defensive), including any other appropriate security measures that should be implemented at commercial shopping centres;
  - d. the training of security staff at commercial shopping centres to deal with mass casualty events;
  - e. how best to educate, advise and alert members of the public who are put at risk by a mass casualty event;
  - f. the coordination of emergency services;
  - g. communication protocols for NSW Police (including the possibility of a central hotline) for the efficient and effective provision of information to families and friends in the aftermath of a mass casualty event;
  - h. the adequacy and appropriateness of industry policies/and or codes of conduct to the media reporting applicable to mass casualty events.

**[Note: the foregoing are proposed for consideration only, and without limitation as to other potential matters that may be the subject of potential recommendations].**